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OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION:
CONSTRAINTS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
ELAINE A. WELLE°
In his thought-provoking article, Professor Clayton Gillette draws an anal-
ogy between contractual default theory and opting out of public provision.'
This creative approach provides an interesting framework within which to
study the propriety of opting out of government services. Given the current
trend toward private governance and the controversial nature of this topic,
Gillette's article should prove to be only the beginning of an important dia-
logue on the propriety of opting out of public provision.
With his characteristic completeness, Gillette astutely anticipates a myriad
of possible concerns and directly addresses them. So, rather than laboriously
reviewing his analysis, I have chosen instead to build upon his framework and
identify issues that warrant further consideration and discussion. Specifically, I
explore the constraints on an individual's freedom to opt out. of certain
governmentally supplied services by drawing further analogies to contract law.
This article begins with a brief discussion of default theory and its appli-
cation in the public provision context. Various constraints on opting out of
public provision are then described, and the appropriateness of these restric-
tions is considered. The article also examines how the default level of services
is set and how opting out may alter the default level.
I. CONTRACTUAL DEFAULT THEORY AS APPLIED TO PUBLIC PROVISION
The default theory concept2 is deceivingly simple. Contractual default
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Colorado, 1977; M.B.A., University of Colorado, 1981; J.D., University of Arizona, 1986. This
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Perspectives on the Current Trend Toward Private Governance, held at the University of Denver
College of Law on March 1-2, 1996. The author thanks Dean Dennis Lynch, the University of
Denver law faculty, and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for sponsoring the Sym-
posium and creating an environment conducive to a productive and stimulating exchange of ideas.
This article benefitted greatly from conversations with Eric Muller and from the comments of
participants at the Symposium. I would also like to thank Teresa Jensen and Federico Cheever
who took the time to comment on an earlier draft, and Marcia Peterson for her research assistance.
Research support for this project was provided by a grant from the George William Hopper Facul-
ty Research Fund.
1. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1185 (1996).
2. While Gillette uses the contractual default model for his analogy, default rules are preva-
lent in other areas of the law that have contractual aspects, such as divorce law, the law of intesta-
cy, tort law, and property law. For example, under the law of intestacy, default rules fill any testa-
mentary gaps. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 n.10 (1989); W. David Slawson, The Futile
Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 29, 30 (1993).
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rules establish contract rights and obligations when an agreement is silent with
respect to certain topics. 3 Default rules often provide supplementary contract
terms when the parties have not agreed otherwise.4 The parties, however, are
free to opt out of these standard default provisions by private agreement if
they strike a different bargain.5 For example, if a contract by a merchant for
the sale of goods is silent with respect to warranties, a warranty of merchant-
ability is implied.6 The parties, however, may waive the warranty or opt for a
different provision by express agreement.7
Gillette proposes we view the level of goods and services the government
provides as a default or background level, since it is available to all residents
simply by virtue of their membership in the community s He argues individu-
als should be permitted to opt for a different level by privately contracting for
more, or possibly even opting for fewer,9 goods or services." Gillette sug-
gests the decision to select one level of service over another may simply re-
flect a desire to achieve individual preferences where that individual is unable
to satisfy his preferences through the political process." He submits allowing
individuals to opt out of public provision may be no more momentous than
opting out of the default rules under contract law. 2 Consequently, we should
not necessarily draw any negative inferences from the fact that some individu-
als may opt for a different level of service, 3 just as they may decide to opt
for a different contract term. Gillette concludes the propriety of opting out
should be determined by weighing the competitive benefits of opting out (effi-
ciency and satisfaction of individual preferences) against the costs of opting
out (in terms of political participation and effect on community). 4
However, even in the contract law context, default theory is not without
constraints and controversy. The freedom to contract itself is limited. For
example, some contracts are unenforceable on public policy grounds, such as
3. The term "default rules" became popular when Ian Ayres and Robert Germer used it in
their seminal article, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
supra note 2. Ayres and Gertner noted that default rules also have been called "background, back-
stop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presump-
tive, standby, standard-form and suppletory rules." Id. at 91 & n.25. For a small sampling of the
literature on contractual default theory, see Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993).
4. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 115, 116 (1993).
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied
by agreement .... ").
6. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1195.
9. Id. at 1216-20.
10. Even though Gillette presents a balanced approach in his inquiry into the propriety of
opting out by addressing the various concerns voiced by Symposium participants, the article, taken
as a whole, generally supports the position that individuals should be free to opt out of public
provision. Implicit in his analysis is the assumption that one should be free to opt for a different
level of government services.
11. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1188.
12. Id. at 1196-97.
13. Id. at 1196.
14. Id. at 1192-93, 1219.
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contracts that restrain trade. 5 A number of these contractual constraints have
been cast as immutable rules applicable to all contracts that may not be varied
by private agreement.' 6 The duty to act in good faith, for instance, is an im-
mutable part of any contract. 7 The parties to a contract may not disclaim
their obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, or care.
8
In the contract law context, there is also debate as to how default rules
should be set. 9 Should default rules reflect what the parties would have
wanted? Should they be designed simply to foster economic efficiency or
preserve contractual relationships? Should default rules promote a certain re-
sult, such as encouraging parties to reveal information? Or should they reflect
communitarian values, such as fairness? This debate focuses on whether de-
fault rules should just describe contracting behavior or prescribe appropriate
rules.
While Gillette discusses the propriety of opting out of public provision, he
only briefly addresses the constraints on one's freedom to opt out of certain
governmentally supplied services." If we are going to apply default rule the-
ory in the public provision context, we must also consider whether there are,
and whether there should be, certain constraints and immutable rules. In addi-
tion, we must gain a better understanding of what the default or background
level of services reflects and consider what it should reflect.
II. CONSTRAINTS AND IMMUTABLE RULES
A. Constraints on Opting Out of Public Provision
Few will quarrel with the general proposition that an individual should be
free to purchase greater security protection or opt out of the public school
system for a private alternative. Nevertheless, there are clearly constraints on
15. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995); JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 98 (3d ed. 1990). Public policy grounds cited by courts
to justify nonenforcement include moral values (policies against impairment of family relation-
ships and against gambling), economic grounds (policies against restraint of trade and restraints on
alienation of property), and the need to protect government institutions (policies against improper-
ly influencing government officials). FARNSWORTH, supra, § 5.2, at 351.
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) (good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care may
not be disclaimed by agreement); U.C.C. § 1-105(2) (1994) (limits a party's right to choose appli-
cable law); U.C.C. § 1-204(1) (1994) (provision for disregarding a clause which fixes a time that
is unreasonable); U.C.C. § 2-718 (1994) (liquidated damages clauses are allowed only where the
amount involved is reasonable); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994) (consequential damages clauses may
not operate in an unconscionable manner).
17. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
18. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1994) (providing that "the obligations of good faith, diligence, rea-
sonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement").
19. The following articles discuss the debate regarding how default rules should be set and
contain citations to the literature in the area: Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 89-95; Burton,
supra note 4, at 116-18; Slawson, supra note 2, at 33.
20. For example, in passing, Gillette suggests raising the cost of exit, up to the point of
prohibition, to transform the background service level from a default rule to an immutable rule,
but then notes that such constraints necessarily impose the costs of noncompetitiveness and result
in the inability of some residents to satisfy their individual preferences. Gillette, supra note 1, at
1204.
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an individual's freedom to opt out of public provision. At some point, the
arms and explosives you have stockpiled for increased security protection
endangers yourself and possibly others, so the government will step in.2 If
the private school system you and your neighbors have established endangers
your child either because it uses corporal punishment or because it does not
meet certain minimum standards, the government intervenes.22
The constraints on one's freedom to opt out of public provision are strik-
ingly similar to the constraints found in contract law. As previously noted,
contract law recognizes many important limitations on the freedom to contract.
Restrictions are placed on the right to contract by legislation and by public
policy.23 As examples, parties cannot create a binding contract to commit a
crime or to commit a tort on a third party.24 There are also certain immutable
rules that may not be varied by agreement, such as the duty to act in good
faith."
These contractual constraints and immutable rules are designed to protect
the parties to the contract26 or the parties outside the contract" from the so-
cially deleterious effects of unregulated contracting. These rules limit the
freedom to contract on the grounds that parties internal or external to the con-
tract cannot adequately protect themselves or others without government inter-
vention.
21. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-12-109 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (prohibits the possession
or control of an explosive or incendiary device); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-11 (1995) (prohibits
possession of explosives); Wyo. STAT. § 35-10-301 (1994) (prohibits storing explosive materials
in or near any residence); see also People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1988) (defendant
convicted of possessing incendiary devices); State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1987) (de-
fendant convicted of criminal possession of explosives).
22. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
87, 92 (1996) ("Parents cannot elect to send their children to a school which refuses to teach read-
ing or to a school which practices brutal corporal punishment."); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
280.21 (West 1996) ("An employee of an accredited public school district, accredited nonpublic
school, or area education agency shall not inflict, or cause to be inflicted, corporal punishment
upon a student."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (sets forth compulso-
ry instruction standards, including curriculum areas and requirements for instructors); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 21-107 (West 1989) (authorizing a state board to set minimum standards for pri-
vate schools); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 161a(c) (1989 & Supp. 1995) ("No person employed by
or agent of a public or approved school shall inflict or cause to be inflicted corporal punishment
upon a pupil attending the school or the institution.").
23. See supra note 15.
24. RICHARD A. LORD, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1, at 570 (4th ed. 1993).
25. See supra notes 16-18.
26. Several of the nonvariable provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code are intended to
prevent one party from taking undue advantage of another. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1994) (pro-
tecting against unconscionable contracts); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) (protecting against bad faith).
27. Several Uniform Commercial Code provisions are designed to protect the interest of
third parties. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (1994) (protects good faith purchasers for value); U.C.C. §
2-702(3) (1994) (protects the rights of buyers in the ordinary course and other good faith purchas-
ers). Earlier drafts of U.C.C. § 1-102 provided that "[elxcept as otherwise provided by this Act the
rights and duties of a third party may not be adversely varied by an agreement to which he is not
a party or by which he is not otherwise bound." The subsection, however, was deleted reportedly
because it was deemed unnecessary. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, I UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 3-11, at 183 (4th ed. 1995).
28. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 88-89; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
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This same rationale explains certain constraints on an individual's freedom
to opt out of public provision. In some situations, opting for more or less
government services may have socially detrimental effects. Government inter-
venes to protect the parties themselves or to protect third parties from the
possible consequences of an individual's actions. Intervention generally takes
the form of prohibitions or restrictions on an individual's ight to opt for a
different level of services.29
For example, one's freedom to opt out of public provision is constrained
by common law and by legislation. The term legislation is used here in the
broadest sense, to include not only constitutions and statutes but also adminis-
trative regulations and local ordinances. Such constraints can be federal, state,
or local. Assume, for instance, that your local government conducts a spraying
program in your town each summer to control the mosquito population. The
type of spray a local government may administer must comply with federal
regulations." Your local government is prohibited from using a pesticide that
would be harmful to humans or a pesticide that would harm a local endan-
gered species.3 If the approved form of pesticide fails to eliminate all the
pesky mosquitos in your yard, your individual ability to privately opt out and
use a more lethal spray or a larger dosage may be constrained by federal,
state, or even local regulations. Such constraints may be in part to protect you
from the harmful effects of such a spray, to protect your neighbors from the
29. This is not to say that it might not be better, from an economic perspective, to use finan-
cial penalties to discourage harm-producing behavior and financial rewards to encourage harm-
reducing behavior. Several commentators have observed that it is economically inefficient for
government to prohibit or restrict behavior. They have suggested that it would be better, on eco-
nomic grounds, for government to create market incentives to engage in socially desirable con-
duct, rather than to prohibit socially undesirable behavior. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regula-
tory State, 62 U. Cmn. L. REV. 1, 112-14 (1995).
30. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) ("[N]o person in any State may distribute or sell to any
person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter. To the extent necessary to pre-
vent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the Administrator may by regulation limit
the distribution, sale, or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under this subchap-
ter .. ").
31. For instance, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service determined Bufo hem iophrys
baxteri (the "Wyoming toad") had virtually disappeared from all known sites, in part, due to the
use of certain herbicides and mosquito control techniques. The Service concluded that the Wyo-
ming toad was an endangered species and therefore protected under the federal Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (ESA). Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination That
Bufo Hemiophrys Baxteri (Wyoming Toad) is an Endangered Species, 49 Fed. Reg. 1992, 1992-
93 (1984). The ESA makes it unlawful for any person to harm an endangered species, unless the
Secretary of the Interior grants a permit allowing the activity under such terms as the Secretary
shall prescribe. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1),
1539(a)(1)(B) (1994) (the ESA prohibits "taking" of endangered species, defines "taking" to in-
clude "harm," and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant permits for certain takings).
Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407,
2409-10 (1995) (facial challenge to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service definition of
"harm," as part of the definition of "take," under the ESA; the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service definition of "harm" specifically includes habitat modification that results in disruption of
essential behavior patterns). Use of herbicides and mosquito control techniques that would harm
the Wyoming toad therefore are prohibited, unless a permit is obtained and the herbicides and
mosquito control techniques used comply with the terms of the permit.
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effects, and also possibly to protect the environment and endangered species
from your actions.
There also appear to be constraints in the public provision context analo-
gous to immutable rules. Immutable rules are mandatoryrequirements applica-
ble to all contracts which may not be altered by private agreement.32 These
rules often set minimum standards or basic requirements that apply to all con-
tracts, such as the obligation to act in good faith. In the public provision
context, there are standards and requirements applicable to all which are simi-
lar to immutable rules. As an example, compulsory education laws set mini-
mum standards that apply to all.33 A parent may decide to opt out of the pub-
lic school system for a private alternative, but may not decide to forgo his or
her child's education completely. Additionally, states often set minimum re-
quirements for all schools, both public and private, by specifying curriculum
areas, teacher certification standards, and the number of days or hours of
instruction.3" Another example is mandatory immunization programs. Many
states require school children to be immunized against certain communicable
diseases.3"
Clearly, there are numerous constraints on an individual's freedom to opt
out of public provision. Gillette, however, fails to address these constraints in
his analysis. Given the pervasiveness of such constraints, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to examine the propriety of opting out without first discussing the
limitations on opting out. For Gillette's analytical framework to prove useful,
we must either recognize and describe these limitations, or, at least, directly
address why such constraints are not necessary.
B. The Propriety of Constraints on Opting Out of Public Provision
These limitations on the freedom to opt out of public provision raise the
question: to what extent is government intrusion into private arrangements
justified? The law and economics movement has fought long and hard in the
contract law context to restrict the number and impact of governmentally im-
posed constraints and immutable rules. Yet even the most ardent supporters of
the law and economics movement recognize the need for certain limitations on
an individual's freedom to contract, such as when constraints are necessary to
32. See supra notes 16-18.
33. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993) (compulsory instruction); see also
Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard,
62 U. Cm. L. REv. 363, 370 (1995) ("[E]very state has enacted compulsory education laws, and
many additionally regulate curriculum content, teacher certification, and the number of hours and
days of instruction."); David M. Smolin, Comment, State Regulation of Private Education: Ohio
Law in the Shadow of the United States Supreme Court Decisions, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003, 1013
(1986) (noting that "every state has a compulsory education law, and every state regulates private
education").
34. See supra notes 22 & 33.
35. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-673 (1993) (local health department shall provide for re-
quired immunization of pupils attending school at no cost); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-905 (Supp.
1995) (local health department shall provide, at public expense, required immunizations); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 232.032 (West Supp. 1996) (immunization shall be required for certain communica-
ble diseases and shall be available at no cost from local county health units).
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protect the interests of third parties.3 6 It is generally agreed that if individual
actions produce harm to others, government intervention is appropriate.37
Similarly, one can argue that constraints on the freedom to opt out of the
default level of services are warranted when such constraints protect the inter-
ests of third parties, including the general interests of society at large.
Most of the debate in the contract law area has focused on the propriety
of what have been termed "paternalistic" constraints.3" In general, any legal
rule that prohibits an action on the grounds that it would be contrary to the
actor's own welfare is considered paternalistic. Examples of contractual con-
straints that have been categorized as paternalistic include rules invalidating
agreements to waive the right to obtain a divorce or to file for bankruptcy
relief.39 An example of a paternalistic constraint in the public provision con-
text would be laws that make education compulsory.'
Gillette notes that, in the context of public provision, constraints impose
on society the cost of noncompetitiveness and result in the inability of resi-
dents to satisfy their personal preferences.4 But should economic consider-
ations and personal preferences be considered sovereign? Commentators, such
as Professor Daniel Farber, suggest that limited rationality, imperfect informa-
tion, and transaction costs limit the ability of individuals to protect them-
selves.42 The result is that an individual's ability to order his or her affairs
through voluntary transactions is limited and therefore government intervention
may be warranted in some situations.
In his seminal article, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein criticizes the notion that existing private preferences should
determine what government can and should do.43 Sunstein concludes that,
even where private arrangements do not harm others, a wide variety of factors
may justify government intervention to overturn or counteract existing prefer-
ences. He suggests that there are distortions in a system based on individual
preferences, distortions analogous to the problem of market failure, and that
such distortions require collective action.
Sunstein identifies four basic categories where interference with private
preferences may be justified." First, sometimes the majority may have a col-
lective preference that differs from the choices of its individual members. The
public, acting through government, may wish to bind itself against its own
36. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAw 253-54 (1979) (acknowledging that certain limits on the freedom to contract may promote
efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate voluntary transactions).
37. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. C. L. REv. 1129,
1130 (1986). Admittedly, in this era of relativism, it may be difficult to agree on what type of
"harm to others" is sufficient to justify legal intervention.
38. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ch. 7
(1993); Kronman, supra note 28; Sunstein, supra note 37, at 1130.
39. See Kronman, supra note 28, at 764.
40. See supra notes 22 & 33.
41. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1204.
42. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L.
REv. 303, 306 (1983).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 37.
44. Id. at 1138-68.
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misguided choices. The second category includes preferences that are the prod-
uct of legal rules or socialization. For instance, preferences may become dis-
torted by the absence of available opportunities or the existing distribution of
wealth and entitlements. In some circumstances, the endogenous character of
these preferences will justify intervention. The third category consists of pref-
erences that reflect motivational distortions, such as addictions, habits, and
myopic behavior. When there is such a problem, government intervention may
make the individual better off in terms of welfare and perhaps autonomy.
Finally, personal preferences are sometimes based on inadequate information,
including lack of knowledge or cognitive biases when dealing with low-proba-
bility events. When a decision is based on imperfect information, government
may either provide the information or ban the decision entirely.
Other commentators have defended the notion that government may con-
strain an individual's freedom to contract on various grounds, such as consid-
erations of economic efficiency45 and distributive justice,' the idea of per-
sonal integrity,4 and notions of sound judgment." The same concerns and
considerations appear equally applicable in the public provision context. Gov-
ernment intervention in the public provision context may be warranted to pro-
tect third parties, to secure collective preferences, to promote economic effi-
ciency and distributive goals, and to address the problems created by endoge-
nous preferences, motivational distortions, and inadequate information.
The formulation of a comprehensive theory to describe and evaluate the
various limitations on an individual's freedom to opt out of public provision is
well beyond the scope of this short article. My intent is to suggest that certain
constraints are warranted,49 and to indicate the need for a conceptual frame-
work to describe and evaluate these constraints before we can even begin to
45. In Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, Professor Anthony Kronman argues that cer-
tain contractual rules, such as nondisclmable warranties, are efficiency-enhancing adjuncts to the
fraud remedy that reduce transaction costs. Kronman, supra note 28, at 766-70.
46. Kronman suggests that prohibitions against waiver of contractual entitlements may pro-
mote distributive goals. For example, the nondisclaimable warranty of habitability promotes the
redistributive goal of providing minimally decent housing for all. Id. at 770-74.
47. Kronman contends that prohibitions against contracting away too large a part of one's
personal liberties protect against the threat such contractual provisions would pose to a promisor's
integrity or self-respect, especially in situations where the promisor's values could change dramati-
cally after entering into the contract. This explains, in part, prohibitions against agreements waiv-
ing the right to sue for divorce. Id. at 774-86.
48. Restrictions prohibiting enforcement of agreements entered into while the promisor's
reasoning may have been impaired, such as when the promisor is a minor, incompetent, or during
mandatory "cooling-off periods," have been justified as reflecting a respect for the notion of sound
judgment. Id. at 786-97.
49. This is not to suggest that government intervention is some form of panacea. I agree
with Pildes's and Sunstein's assessment that modem regulation suffers from "myopia, interest-
group pressure, draconian responses to sensationalist anecdotes, poor priority setting, and simple
confusion." Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 4. Government intervention is not without risk.
Government action does not necessarily make things better and the risks inherent in interfering
with individual preferences can be formidable. The risk of abuse is also significant. Nevertheless,
government intervention in some situations appears warranted. The solution is not to completely
reject the notion of intervention, but instead to consider regulatory reform, such as market incen-
tives rather than outright prohibitions. See supra note 29.
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assess the propriety of allowing individuals the unrestrained ability to opt out
of public provision.
III. THE DEFAULT LEVEL
A. The Default Level and What It Represents in the Public Provision Context
Gillette proposes we view the level of goods and services the government
provides to its constituents as a default or background level."0 He suggests
this default level serves the same function as contractual default rules in that it
applies to those who do not expressly bargain for a contrary outcome. But
how is the default level of goods and services determined and what does it
represent?
Obviously the package of goods and services the government provides is
determined in large part through the political process. Gillette observes that the
default level may not necessarily reflect the preferences of a majority of con-
stituents." Instead, the mix may reflect the preferences of the median voter
or the desires of a discrete, yet dominant, minority.52
As is clear to anyone who has complained about police protection, street
paving, snow removal, or mosquito control, the level of public services provid-
ed does not necessarily reflect consumer demand. One must remember, how-
ever, that government plays an allocative role.53 The default level reflects a
myriad of considerations and a variety of goals. Since unrestrained voluntary
market transactions do not always produce socially optimal results, the
government's role is also to correct market deficiencies, such as problems
created by externalities, distributional inequities, informational disabilities, and
free riders. As a result, the mix of goods and services provided reflects,
among other things, an allocation of resources, political compromise, regard
for external effects, distributional considerations, and other societal interests.
Allocation of resources. Only a finite amount of resources and a limited
amount of tax dollars are available for governmentally supplied services. Giv-
en these constraints, the government must allocate resources. Theoretically, the
government examines and prioritizes its constituents' wants and needs, and
then determines what and how much of each good and service to provide. In
theory at least, the government represents the interests of society at large. The
50. See Gillette, supra note I, at 1195.
51. Id. at 1199-1201. Gillette suggests that since any government service typically can be
provided on a continuum and individual services in the mix may be traded against each other, a
majority of constituents is unlikely to prefer any particular package, even though a majority might
prefer a certain level of an individual service. Id. at 1200-01.
52. See id. at 1199-1201. Public choice theory indicates the level of services provided by the
government will correspond to the preferences of the median voter. The median voter reflects the
position that can attract more support than any other position in an election. Id. Gillette hypothe-
sizes that on issues where a certain group of voters exhibit great intensity of interest, and other
voters appear less interested in the issue, the default level is more likely to reflect the preferences
of the interested minority. Id.
53. See CLAYTON P. GiLLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 37-55
(1994) (discussing government functions and collective action problems).
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mix of services the government provides constitutes an allocation, reflecting
social costs and benefits.
Political compromise. Compromise is inevitable. No one should be sur-
prised that the mix of governmentally provided services reflects majoritarian
preferences with respect to the level of some services, but also reflects the
desires of dominant minorities with respect to the level of other services. No
individual or group has all of its preferences satisfied.
External effects. In deciding whether and how much of a service to pro-
vide, the government takes into account external effects that individual self-
interested transacting parties may not consider. The default level reflects a
weighing of the positive and negative effects of services on parties and
nonparties. Implicit in the level of services provided are the legislative and
public policy constraints previously discussed.
Distributional considerations. The maintenance of a minimum or baseline
standard of living is also implicit in the mix. Government serves a
redistributive function.54 It limits variations in wealth, or at least insures that
the financially or physically disadvantaged do not fall below a given baseline.
Redistribution efforts take the form of nonfinancial rights and policies, such as
passage and enforcement of civil rights legislation. Redistribution efforts also
take the form of services and financial support, such as welfare payments,
social security disability benefits, and Medicaid which are funded by a pro-
gressive taxation scheme. In effect, government provides a social safety net
which is reflected in its allocation of goods and services.
Other societal interests. The default level also reflects notions of fairness,
equality, and social contract. For example, the common law doctrine of equal
service provision obligates the government to offer the same level of services
to all its constituents." It may not discriminate. The mix of governmentally
supplied goods and services includes the provision of basic services on an
equal basis to all constituents, such as public education and public health ser-
vices. The mix includes goods and services to which all are entitled regardless
of ability to pay.
B. The Effect of Opting Out of the Default Level in the Public Provision
Context
But what should the default level reflect? In the contract law context, a
central focus of recent scholarship has been a debate over the role and content
of contractual default rules.56 Commentators have questioned whether con-
tractual default rules should reflect what the majority of parties would have
54. Id. at 57.
55. See, e.g., Veach v. City of Phoenix, 427 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1967); see also CHARLES M.
HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS, A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOV-
ERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY
(1986); Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 946 (1987) (reviewing Haar and Fessler's book, The Wrong Side of the Tracks, and offer-
ing theoretical bases to support the doctrine of equal service provision).
56. See supra note 19.
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wanted, principles of economic efficiency, communitarian values, or norms
implicit in the parties' relationship. The default level in the public provision
context appears susceptible to the same type of inquiry and critical analysis.
Should the default level in the context of public provision reflect majoritarian
preferences, simply correct market deficiencies, provide a social safety net, or
promote communitarian values? Without a greater understanding of what the
default level of services represents and without considering what it should re-
flect, it is difficult to assess the propriety of opting out of the default level.
Gillette suggests that if the default level of services does not reflect
majoritarian preferences, then opting for a different level of services might be
appropriate because opting out does not remove you from the core of the com-
munity and it may play a productive signaling role.57 On the other hand,
there are strong reasons not to allow individuals to bargain their way out of
the default level. If the default level reflects an allocation of resources, politi-
cal compromise, consideration of external effects, redistributive goals, and
other societal interests, opting out may disrupt what appears to be a very deli-
cate balance. Opting out may very well change the default level and what it
represents, without the benefit of public deliberation and debate.
Effect on the mix of goods and services provided. Unconstrained opting
out may alter the mix of governmentally supplied goods and services, thereby
changing the default level. For instance, if certain economies of scale are nec-
essary for the provision of a service, opting out may adversely affect the feasi-
bility of providing the default level preferred by those who remain." Opting
out may lead to a situation where public provision of a service is abandoned
because there remains an insufficient number of people to make the invest-
ment worthwhile or the increased per capita cost results in the service becom-
ing prohibitively expensive.
Political impact. As Gillette indicates, opting out may also impose politi-
cal costs by reducing the ability of those who remain to form effective coali-
tions to obtain public provision at the level they desire.59 Additionally, if
those who opt out of public provision must pay for the default level, they may
actively encourage reduced outlays for services they do not use or refuse to
support the default level.' Unconstrained opting out therefore may affect the
allocation of resources, the default level of services provided, the political
dynamics, and even undermine to some extent, collective provision.
57. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 1202-04.
58. Id. at 1211.
59. Id. at 1201-02.
60. Id. at 1207. For example, Daniel Bell observed:
Local government officials and even state legislatures are facing demands from [Resi-
dential Community Association (RCA)] members for tax reimbursements for the provi-
sion of local services such as snow and ice removal, street lighting, and the collection of
garbage. RCAs argue that since they pay for their own services through homeowner
associations, why should they pay property taxes for duplicating public services that
they do not need?
Daniel A. Bell, Residential Community Associations: Community or Disunity?, 5 REsPONSIVE
CoMMUNrrY 25, 34 (Fall 1995).
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Social consequences. The default level currently serves as a social safety
net by providing certain basic services to all constituents. If opting out results
in a reduction in the level or availability of these basic services, then opting
out may tear at the social safety net and undermine redistributive goals.
Many current government services are a response to the needs of disad-
vantaged groups that were ignored by the private sector. If opting out results
in the elimination of certain public services, private providers may be unwill-
ing to render the services to some segments of society. Private firms have a
strong economic incentive to skim off the best clients and the most profitable
services.6 Opting out may leave those most in need of certain services with-
out private providers and therefore without services. As a result, opting out is
likely to have a disproportionate effect on the disadvantaged.
Gillette notes that in the public provision context the law only requires
equality of opportunity, not equality of result.62 Thus, if everyone is free to
opt out, the equal service requirement is not violated. As Gillette himself
pointed out in an earlier writing, this argument has the "quality of denying the
rich as well as the poor the right to sleep under bridges." '63 Since many public
services are now available to all regardless of the ability to pay, the disadvan-
taged will be most affected if public services are reduced. The disadvantaged
may find themselves with certain public services eliminated, with the right to
opt for more services, but with no ability to pay for such services and no
private providers. Hence, opting out provides a vehicle to grant the disadvan-
taged a meaningless right in exchange for a possible decrease in benefits.
Opting out also has the potential to create and magnify social division and
conflict. Individuals who pay for private services are likely to resent paying
for duplicate public services they do not need.' This resentment may result
in a decreased sense of loyalty and commitment to the larger community.'
We have already witnessed the trend that Robert Reich characterized as "the
secession of the successful."' The wealthy have begun to withdraw to resi-
dential communities that privately provide their own parks, streets, swimming
pools, and security guards, from which the public is excluded. Exclusive com-
munities and gated neighborhoods exacerbate the schism between the rich and
61. ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 85 (1992) (citing as an example experiences under the Job Training
Partnership Act).
62. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1214.
63. Gillette, supra note 55, at 955. Gillette was paraphrasing a quote from Antole France's
Le Lys Rouge, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich, as well as the poor, to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets .... " See id. at 955 n.26 (quoting A. France, Le Lys Rouge
(1894), also quoted in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
64. EvAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA, HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESI-
DENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 186 (1994); see also supra note 60.
65. Gillette counters that residents who are able to opt out might choose to pay for benefits
they do not enjoy either out of altruism or to protect property values. Gillette, supra note I, at
1209-11. William Schneider may have dealt with this type of argument best when addressing the
problems facing urban centers: "But isn't it 'in the national interest' to bail out the cities? The
suburbs have given their answer: walled communities." William Schneider, The Suburban Century
Begins, THE ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33.
66. Robert Reich, Secession of the Successful, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine),
at 42.
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the poor. As Gillette points out, these and other institutions that would be used
to effect opting out are consistently under attack as exclusionary, discrimina-
tory, and elitist. 67 A preoccupation with the virtues of competitive benefits
and individual autonomy may cause one to overlook other interests vital to our
well-being as a nation, such as fairness and decency.
Cause for Concern. Certain characteristics of public provision are them-
selves valuable, such as the process of public deliberation and debate. Implicit
in proposals such as Gillette's that champion unconstrained opting out is the
belief that private contract and personal preferences should be sovereign and
inviolable, therefore insulated from public review. Yet opting out of the de-
fault level has public consequences. It is more than simply a matter of private
contract and personal preference. Such private transactions have public effects:
effects on the parties to the contract, effects on third parties, and effects on the
community. As previously discussed, some individual preferences are objec-
tionable, such as when they harm third parties, when they interfere with col-
lective preferences, or when they are the product of cognitive distortions.'
Proposals that champion unconstrained opting out are attempting a sleight of
hand by dressing up something that is public as private, and then suggesting it
is sacred and outside the realm of public debate. Given the public effects of
opting out and the potential effect on the default level itself, these private
choices must continue to be subject to critical scrutiny, public debate, and
regulation, not canonized.
Gillette characterizes opting out as an alternative form of privatization.'
The danger of this form of privatization is that it does not require a conscious
public decision to shift government functions to private providers.' Privatiza-
tion occurs without public discussion, without consideration of other approach-
es, without analysis of the costs and benefits, without knowing the implica-
tions of the decision, and without government action. Opting out results in de
facto privatization as government functions are gradually transferred to private
providers. The default level of services is altered without public deliberation
and debate, despite possibly significant public consequences. Before we enthu-
siastically embrace the concept of opting out, we must collectively consider
the broader economic, political, and social implications.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Gillette's use of default rule theory in the public provision
context provides an excellent framework within which to examine the propri-
ety of opting out of public provision. By drawing further analogies to contract
law, I have attempted to build on his analysis and identify issues that warrant
67. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1190; see, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 64; Bell, supra note 60;
David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995).
68. See supra part ll.B.
69. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1187.
70. Cf MCKENZIE, supra note 64, at 180 (arguing community-interest developments consti-
tute de facto privatization undertaken without the benefit of public deliberation or debate).
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consideration and discussion. For example, the constraints on one's freedom to
opt out of public provision appear analogous to the limitations on one's free-
dom to contract. Many of these constraints on opting out may be defended on
the same grounds used to justify limitations on the freedom to contract. Unless
one is willing to blindly accept the virtues of unconstrained opting out, a more
sophisticated theoretical framework, which describes these constraints and
evaluates the propriety of such constraints, appears needed. In addition, paral-
lels are drawn between the default level in the public provision context and
contractual default rules. The role and content of contractual default rules have
been a focus of recent contract scholarship. The default level in the public
provision context appears susceptible to the same type of inquiry and analysis.
Since opting out may potentially alter the default level of services provided,
what the default level reflects and what it should reflect must be considered,
particularly in light of the possible economic, political, and social effects of
opting out.
Edmund Burke wrote, "The effect of liberty to individuals is that they
may do what they please; we ought to see what it will please them to do,
before we risk congratulations .. . ." We should heed Burke's warning. Be-
fore enthusiastically embracing the concept of unconstrained opting out of
public provision, we should first examine what individuals may desire to do
and then consider the consequences.
71. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 8 (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1790).
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